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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The Failure of Storytelling to Ground a Causal Theory of Reference. (May 2004) 
Charles William Tanksley, B.A., Samford University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Christopher Menzel 
 
 
 I argue that one cannot hold a Meinongian ontology of fictional characters and 
have a causal theory of reference for fictional names.  The main argument presented 
refutes Edward Zalta’s claim that storytelling should be considered an extended baptism 
for fictional characters.  This amounts to the claim that storytelling fixes the reference of 
fictional names in the same way that baptism fixes the reference of ordinary names, and 
this is just a claim about the illocutionary force of these two types of utterance.  To 
evaluate this argument, therefore, we need both a common understanding of the 
Meinongian ontology and a common taxonomy of speech acts.  I briefly sketch the 
Meinongian ontology as it is laid out by Zalta in order to meet the former condition.  
Then I present an interpretation of the taxonomy of illocutionary acts given by John 
Searle in the late 1970s and mid 1980s, within which we can evaluate Zalta’s claims.  
With an ontology of fictional characters and a taxonomy of speech acts in place, I go on 
to examine the ways in which the Meinongian might argue that storytelling is an 
extended baptism.  None of these arguments are tenable—there is no way for the act of 
storytelling to serve as an extended baptism.  Therefore, the act of storytelling does not 
constitute a baptism of fictional characters; that is, storytelling fails to ground a causal 
chain of reference to fictional characters. 
iv 
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1 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 Fictional characters are all around us: the actions, experiences, and choices of 
characters in movies, sitcoms, and books are constant topics for conversation, and this is 
not just idle chatter.  Though the example itself comes from fiction, the recent movie The 
Hours poignantly demonstrates the way a fictional character, Mrs. Dalloway, can 
permeate the lives of ordinary people.  Talk of fiction and fictional characters abounds 
and is non-trivial; but all this talk about fictional characters raises two important 
questions:  
 (1) What ontology of fictional characters should we adopt? 
 (2) What is the nature of reference to fictional characters? 
One’s answer to the first question will direct the way he or she can answer the second.  
One might believe that fictional characters do not exist in any way.  Then reference to 
fictional characters will be explained in terms of empty names, where the goal is to 
explain how a name that actually has no referent can still be used in meaningful 
sentences.1  A variation on the empty name theme is to take fictions generally to be 
pretenses or acts of make-believe.  This view, pretense theory, generally holds that 
fictional name will refer not to an object but to our acting as if the object exists.2  
Similarly, one can take fictional characters as intentional objects—objects within the 
mind.3  Alternatively one can hold that fictional names are not empty but actually refer 
                                                 
This thesis follows the style of The Chicago Manual of Style. 
1 See Everett and Hofweber 2000 section I. 
2 See Walton 1990 and Everett and Hofweber 2000 section II. 
3 Martinich 2001. 
2 
to objects—abstract objects to be more precise.  In what follows we will assume the 
answer to question (1) above is a version of this view championed by Edward Zalta.4
 In this ontology we distinguish between two kinds of objects, ordinary and 
abstract.  Ordinary objects are those objects which might have existed in space and time.  
In the realm of ordinary objects we find Abraham Lincoln, Mars, and the (possible) first 
colony on Mars.  In comparison with these entities, abstract objects are just those 
objects which could never be spatiotemporal, e.g., the number four, the round square, 
and Sherlock Holmes.5  Since abstract objects are not the sorts of things we can go out 
looking for, we need a way to know just which abstract objects there are.  According to 
the comprehension principle for abstract objects, “for every condition on properties, 
there is an abstract object which is determined by just the properties meeting the 
condition” (Zalta 1983, 12).  This comprehension principle could, on the face of it, lead 
to trouble.  After all, as Russell pointed out, this comprehension principle implies that 
the existent golden mountain exists, and this is not so.  To avoid Meinong’s original 
logical troubles, Zalta introduces a distinction involving the way objects have properties.  
Ordinary objects exemplify properties.  Mars, for instance, exemplifies the property 
‘being the fourth planet.’  It is contingent whether Mars exemplify this property.  
Abstract objects, on the other hand, can also encode properties.  The comprehension 
principle states that there is an object “determined” by every condition on properties.  
Zalta draws on a distinction made by Ernst Mally, namely: an object can be determined 
                                                 
4 See Zalta 1983, 1989, 2000, and 2003.  Another important interpretation of the Meinongian ontology and 
fictional characters can be found in Parsons 1980.  For an explication of a non-Meinongian approach see 
Thomasson 1999. 
5 See Zalta 2000 for a concise summary of his ontology. 
3 
by properties without satisfying those properties.  Zalta translates the notion of satisfying 
into our ordinary notion of exemplifying—an object must exemplify a property in order 
to be said to satisfy it—and the notion of determining into the new notion of encoding.   
 It is an axiom of Zalta’s ontology that no ordinary object can encode any 
properties.  Abstract objects, however, can both encode and exemplify properties.  The 
existent golden mountain encodes the properties ‘being golden,’ ‘being a mountain,’ and 
‘existing,’ but this does not mean that it exemplifies any of these properties.  In fact, it 
exemplifies the property of ‘not existing.’  Similarly, the round square encodes the 
properties of ‘being round’ and ‘being square,’ but exemplifies the property of ‘being 
impossible.’  One motivation behind the axiom that no ordinary object encodes any 
property is to avoid the consequence that an ordinary object and an abstract object be 
identical.  That is, since there is an abstract object determined by every condition on 
properties, there is an abstract object that encodes all the properties Abraham Lincoln 
exemplifies.  Since two objects are identical iff (a) neither encodes any properties and 
they exemplify all the same properties, or (b) both encode the same properties.  The 
properties an abstract object encodes determine the identity of that object.  Since we only 
know a limited amount about the properties certain abstract objects encode, we must 
allow incomplete objects into our ontology.  That is, all we know about the round square 
is that it encodes these two properties.  Since we do not know whether it encodes the 
property ‘being blue,’ it cannot be a complete object.  Similarly, since any condition on 
properties determines an abstract object, there must be impossible objects. 
4 
 Fictional characters are, as we have seen, just one kind of abstract object.  They 
are, however, dependent upon another abstract object: stories.  A story is an abstract 
object that was written by an author and which encodes only vacuous properties.  
Vacuous properties are properties that are constructed out of other properties, e.g., 
‘being such that Reagan was President,’ ‘being such that 7+5=12,’ and ‘being such that 
the world is round.’  A story encodes “exactly the properties F which are constructed out 
of propositions true according to the story” (Zalta 1983, 91).  The author of a story is the 
person who decides which propositions are true according to the story and which are not.  
The author does not create a story in an absolute sense, rather her act of creation consists 
in determining which abstract object is to count as her story.  She does this by deciding 
which propositions are true in her story.  This is, of course, an act requiring great skill 
and creativity.  Stories, as abstract objects, exemplify as well as encode properties.  
While the author determines which properties her story encodes, the rest of the world 
determines which properties her story exemplifies.  Furthermore, while a story can only 
encode vacuous properties, it can exemplify any property.  For example, Casablanca 
encodes the property ‘being such that Rick owns a bar’ and exemplifies the properties 
‘being such that Rick is played by Bogart,’ and (perhaps) ‘being the greatest movie of all 
time.’  The former exemplified property is, of course, a vacuous property while the 
second is not.  A story is any continuous narrative written by an author in which one or 
more characters are in common.  Thus, the ‘Holmes stories,’ though made up of many 
individual stories, should count as one, unified work.6
                                                 
6 There are numerous problems with this conception of story, but examining these will take us too far 
5 
 With a notion of story in hand, we can further define native story as the story in 
which a given character first appears.  So, Holmes is native to the Holmes stories, and 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern to Hamlet, though the former appears in The Seven Per 
Cent Solution and the latter in Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead.  Distinguishing 
native from non-native stories allows Zalta to claim that the condition on properties 
which determines the identity of fictional character is the set of properties attributed to 
that character in its native story.  This set of properties is, except in the shortest of 
stories, quite large.  The identity of stories and characters is closely intertwined, so any 
change in the one effects a change in the other, but this means that any change in one 
character effects a change in the story and this change effects a change in all the other 
characters.  Consider the case of Holmes.  Holmes encodes the properties ‘being a 
detective,’ ‘living at 221B Baker Street,’ and ‘being friends with a doctor named 
Watson.’  However, if Doyle had decided to not make Watson a doctor, but a lawyer 
instead, Holmes would exemplify the property ‘being friends with a lawyer named 
Watson’ and a host of related properties.  The slightest change in one character affects 
them all.  It should be further noted that characters need not be animate objects: any 
object which appears in a fictional story is itself a fictional character, though many 
characters in every story are not native to that story.  The distinction between native and 
non-native stories keeps us from having to say that Holmes encodes the property ‘having 
                                                                                                                                                
astray.  It should be noted, however, that Zalta’s notion will have problems with cases like J. D. Salinger’s 
Catcher in the Rye, as Salinger published many versions of parts of this story in magazines before 
publishing the actual book, but, though these stories share a central character, the novel is taken as its own 
story. Zalta will also have difficulty in cases where two authors write the same story without knowing it, 
e.g., the situation recounted in Borges’s “Pierre Menard, Author of Don Quixote,” and cases in which two 
people co-author a book then split up and each writes a sequel in which the main character from the first 
book acts in drastically different ways.  
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said “Elementary, my dear Watson,”’ since he did not say this in the stories of Doyle—
his native stories.  This result is helpful if we are to identify a character with a story and 
a story with an author. 
 With an answer to our first question under our belt we can now ask the second: 
What is the nature of reference to fictional characters?  Daniel Hunter frames the 
problem as one of establishing reference: 
 the positive thesis of the [causal theory of reference] cannot be correct 
when applied to fictional names.  For nonexistents cannot interact 
causally with existents.  We cannot trace our reference to Holmes back to 
an ostensive baptizing of Holmes because no one could have pointed at 
Holmes and said ‘I dub thee Holmes.’  (Hunter 1981, 27) 
One strength of the causal theory of names over the description theory is that one’s 
reference to an object does not depend on one’s knowledge about that object.  A 
description theory of reference applied to fictional characters would severely complicate 
discourse about those characters: if one person associates the set of properties X with 
‘Holmes’ and another person associates a different set of properties Y with Holmes they 
are talking about two different abstract objects with their uses of ‘Holmes,’ since each 
set of properties picks out a unique object.  The causal theory of reference, if applicable 
to abstract objects, would secure reference to Holmes by uses of ‘Holmes’ since the 
context of utterance (i.e., the external features that determine whether a given discourse 
is about the Conan Doyle stories or The Seven Per Cent Solution), rather than the 
speaker, would determine the reference.  Hunter’s objection is that there is no way for an 
author to baptize a fictional character, and the consequence of this claim for reference is 
7 
that the causal theory must be abandoned: there is no way for a causal chain to link a use 
of ‘Holmes’ with Holmes if the causal chain can never get started. 
 Edward Zalta takes up Hunter’s challenge and argues that the act of storytelling 
ought to be considered an extended baptism of fictional characters and the stories in 
which they appear.7  Zalta argues that there are salient similarities between an act of 
storytelling and a standard baptismal locution.  A standard baptism is “a speech act more 
like proposing a definition than asserting something about the object being baptized;” 
likewise “the act of storytelling [. . .] is a speech act more similar to definition than to 
assertion” (Zalta 2003, 7-8).  The differences between standard baptisms and storytelling 
utterances are brushed aside:  
 [U]nlike baptisms of existing objects, in which the name being introduced 
is used once, baptisms of [abstract] objects frequently involve many uses 
of the name throughout the course of the baptism.  However, as in 
definitions in which a single word is being introduced into the language, 
all of the words in the definiens have their ordinary meanings.  This 
reveals that baptisms of characters, like definitions, can be considered 
special uses of language. (Zalta 2003, 8) 
Zalta’s argument here relies on an explicit invocation of a theory of speech acts, though 
the exact workings of the speech act argument are left implicit.  Zalta is arguing that 
since storytelling and standard baptisms are more like definitions than assertions—the 
former is an extended version of the later—but we are not told in what ways storytelling 
and baptism are related, what makes storytelling an extended baptism rather than an 
extended definition, etc.  Even if we accept Zalta’s argument, it is not clear that 
storytelling is an extended baptism.  For all the argument purports to show is that 
                                                 
7 Zalta 2003. 
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storytelling and baptism are speech acts similar to proposing a definition; that is, to use 
Austin’s terminology, that the two are performative utterances.  Now, the class of 
performatives is fairly large, so establishing that storytelling and baptism are both 
performatives is just the first step in making the argument Zalta needs.  Regardless, 
taken as a complete argument or just as part of a larger argument, Zalta’s conclusion 
does not follow.  In Chapter II we will set out a taxonomy of speech acts. In Chapter III 
we will use this taxonomy to evaluate the claim that storytelling is the same speech act 
as baptism and will conclude that storytelling cannot serve as a baptism for fictional 
characters. 
9 
CHAPTER II 
ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS 
 J. L. Austin introduced an interesting type of utterance in his paper “Performative 
Utterances:” by uttering a ‘performative’ one does not report any facts (including the 
fact about what one is doing); rather, to utter a performative is—in itself—to do 
something, to make something the case beyond the utterance itself.  The standard 
examples of performatives include ‘I dub thee N.N.,’ ‘I now pronounce you husband and 
wife,’ ‘I promise to A,’ etc.  In each of these examples, the act of uttering is what counts 
as naming, marrying, or promising: there is not some other act behind the scenes on 
which these utterances report—the speaker does what she aims to do simply by uttering 
the appropriate thing.  Utterance alone does not a performative make, however, most 
performatives are governed by conventions.8  An utterance of ‘I hereby name this ship 
N’ does not perform the action of naming a ship outside of a convention of naming 
ships; one cannot walk up to the U.S.S. Alabama in Mobile Bay and name it ‘Boy 
George’ by simply uttering ‘I hereby name this ship “Boy George;”’ a ship can only be 
named according to certain conventions that determine who can name it and when and 
how it can be named.  An utterance that fails to conform to the required conventions is, 
in Austin’s terminology, infelicitous. 
 Historically, talk of performatives gave way to talk of illocutionary acts.  This 
move accommodates the intuition that assessments, commands, promises, reports, and 
apologies are all ‘performatives’ too, that they are all speech acts.  (Austin’s 
                                                 
8 For an interesting discussion of the role of conventions in performatives, see Strawson 1964. 
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illocutionary taxonomy calls these verdictives, exercitives, commissives, expositives, 
and behabitives, respectively.9)  While Austin’s early paper is important historically and 
includes a number of key insights, it is not the most precise formulation of a taxonomy 
of illocutionary acts.  We therefore turn to the more recent work of John Searle. 
 The first point Searle makes is that illocutionary acts are in many cases conflated 
with the English verbs that convey them.  (Austin himself makes this mistake.)  A 
taxonomy of illocutionary verbs can be useful, but it seriously limits the applicability of 
the taxonomy.  For one thing, a taxonomy of illocutionary verbs is only applicable to one 
language.  Further, a taxonomy of verbs only classifies explicit performative 
utterances—e.g., ‘I order you to Y’ and ‘I promise to do X’—thereby neglecting the wide 
range of implicit illocutionary speech acts.  Searle focuses his taxonomy on illocutionary 
forces, rather than verbs.  Instead of classifying ‘order,’ ‘command,’ ‘ask,’ ‘request,’ 
etc., he classifies speech acts into broader categories such as ‘acts which commit the 
speaker to a future action’ and ‘acts which attempt to get the hearer to commit an 
action.’  Searle’s taxonomy is most clearly laid out in the books Speech Acts (1969), 
Expression and Meaning (1979), and Foundations of Illocutionary Logic (Searle and 
Vanderveken 1985).  Though the specifics of the taxonomy—the criteria for classifying 
illocutionary acts—shift somewhat throughout this time period, the method behind the 
taxonomy remains both consistent and effective.  In this chapter I present a truncated 
version of the taxonomy found in Searle’s Expression and Meaning and then explain the 
developments and alterations to the taxonomy found in his Foundations of Illocutionary 
                                                 
9 See Austin 2001. 
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Logic.  I then offer a new interpretation of the taxonomy that culls the central features 
and insights from both versions of the taxonomy while jettisoning some problems found 
in Expression and Foundations. 
In Expression and Meaning, Searle splits illocutionary acts up into five classes of 
illocutionary force: assertives, directives, commissives, expressives, and declaratives.  In 
order to derive these five illocutionary forces and classify particular speech acts 
according to them, Searle introduces a taxonomy that relies on 12 criteria.  These criteria 
serve to group and sort illocutionary acts.  In this version of the taxonomy, Searle takes 
the following three criteria to be the most important: 
(i)  Differences in the point (or purpose) of the (type of) act. 
(ii)  Differences in the direction of fit between words and the world. 
(iii)  Differences in expressed psychological states (Searle, 1979, 2-8). 10
 
 
These criteria are used to classify speech acts by illocutionary force; this is a rough-
grained classification but is all our interpretation will need from Expression. 
Criterion (i) is what Searle will call “illocutionary point” and is, generally, what 
the speaker is trying to do with an utterance; is she trying to name a person, report on the 
events of her day, or get a hearer to shut the door?  Searle will later say, “In general we 
can say that the illocutionary point of a type of illocutionary act is that purpose which is 
essential to its being an act of that type” (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 14).   This is the 
most straightforward and least technical of the three criteria here: the illocutionary point 
is just the point of the utterance. 
                                                 
10 The numbering in the original is in decimal notation and has been changed here; similarly, the original is 
all in italics and has been changed here as well. 
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Criterion (ii), the direction of fit of an illocutionary act, refers to the relation 
between the words of an utterance and the world.  There are two directions of fit: a 
speaker can try to make the propositional content expressed by her utterance match up 
with the world or a speaker can try to get the world to match up with the propositional 
content expressed by her utterance.  In the former case, the word-to-world direction of 
fit, the speaker tries to speak truthfully, to accurately represent the way things are with 
her utterance; in the latter case, the world-to-word direction of fit, the speaker tries to get 
the world to change in some way to match the propositional content of her utterance.  
This distinction is perhaps best explained in a story told by Searle: 
Suppose a man goes to the supermarket with a shopping list given him by 
his wife on which are written the words ‘beans, butter, bacon, and bread’.  
Suppose as he goes around with his shopping cart selecting these items, 
he is followed by a detective who writes down everything he takes.  As 
they emerge from the store both shopper and detective will have identical 
lists.  But the function of the two lists will be quite different.  In the case 
of the shopper’s list, the purpose of the list is, so to speak, to get the 
world to match the words; the man is supposed to make his actions fit the 
list.  In the case of the detective, the purpose of the list is to make the 
words match the world; the man is supposed to make the list fit the 
actions of the shopper.  This can be further demonstrated by observing the 
role of ‘mistake’ in the two cases.  If the detective gets home and 
suddenly realizes that the man bought pork chops instead of bacon, he can 
simply erase the word ‘bacon’ and write ‘pork chops’.  But if the shopper 
gets home and his wife points out that he has bought pork chops when he 
should have bought bacon he cannot correct the mistake by erasing 
‘bacon’ from the list and writing ‘pork chops’. (Searle 1979, 3-4) 
 
So, to recap: an utterance with a world-to-word direction of fit is one in which the 
speaker tries to get the state of affairs expressed in the propositional content of an 
utterance to obtain via the actions of some agent—hearer or speaker—while a word-to-
13 
world direction of fit is one in which the speaker seeks to accurately represent the world 
in the propositional content of her utterance. 
 In addition to the two primary directions of fit, Searle introduces the null 
direction of fit and the double direction of fit.  In the null direction of fit, “the speaker is 
neither trying to get the world to match the words nor the words to match the world, 
rather the truth of the expressed proposition is presupposed” (Searle 1979, 15).  The null 
direction of fit is characterized by expressive utterances, e.g., ‘I am sorry’ and ‘Thank 
you.’  For an utterance of ‘I am sorry’ to be successful, the speaker must indeed be sorry.  
However, the speaker is not trying to get her words to match the world, since in a 
successful utterance of ‘I am sorry’ the speaker must be sorry.  An assertion tries to get 
the words of the utterance to match the world—the speaker tries to speak truthfully—but 
in a successful utterance of ‘I am sorry’ the speaker cannot help but speak truthfully.  
The double direction of fit, on the other hand, is when the speaker does “attempt to get 
language to match the world [. . . b]ut they do not attempt to do it either by describing an 
existing state of affairs [. . .] nor by trying to get someone to bring about a future state of 
affairs” (Searle 1979, 19).  A successful utterance of ‘I dub thee N.N.’ changes the 
world, it makes it such that the name N.N. refers to a new object.  However, this 
utterance does not try to get the world to match her words; rather, she makes the world 
match her words by utterance alone.  Other examples of the double direction of fit are 
‘You’re out’ and ‘I now pronounce you husband and wife.’  These are utterances in 
which the speaker affects a change by merely speaking. 
14 
Lastly, the sincerity conditions of an utterance (criterion (iii)) are the intentions a 
speaker must have toward the propositional content of his or her utterance.  This is 
perhaps an even more straightforward criterion than illocutionary point, as Searle 
quickly points out that there are only three possible sincerity conditions for the five 
illocutionary forces.  In the discussion of the five illocutionary forces that follows, 
Searle’s understanding of sincerity conditions will come to light, so to avoid repetition I 
will not elaborate on them any more here. 
As noted, Searle’s taxonomy includes five categories of illocutionary forces: 
assertives, directives, commissives, expressives, and declaratives.  Assertives have the 
illocutionary point of committing “the speaker (in varying degrees) to something’s being 
the case, to the truth of the expressed proposition;” (Searle 1979, 12) their direction of fit 
is word-to-world—they are veridical; their sincerity condition is belief, i.e. the speaker is 
committed to believing, to some degree, the proposition he or she asserts.  Example 
assertives are ‘suggest,’ ‘insist,’ ‘state,’ and ‘conclude;’ “the simplest test of an assertive 
is this: can you literally characterize it (inter alia) as true or false,” though this will give 
neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for the class (Searle 1979, 13). 
 Among the illocutionary force of directives we find orders, commands, 
invitations, questions, and advice.  The illocutionary point of a directive is to get the 
hearer to do something; the direction of fit is world-to-word, since they are attempts to 
make the world (the actions of the hearer) match the propositional content of the 
utterance; and their sincerity condition is desire, a desire on the part of the speaker, to 
some degree, that the hearer commit a future action.  For example: ‘Clean your room’ is 
15 
an attempt on the part of a speaker to get a hearer to clean her room, ‘I beg you not to 
tell N’ is an attempt to get a hearer to not divulge some information, and ‘I’ll let you go 
to the movies tonight’ is an attempt to get the hearer to go to the movies by way of 
granting permission so to do. 
 Commissives parallel directives: their illocutionary point is to commit the 
speaker to a future action; their direction of fit is therefore also world-to-word; and their 
sincerity condition is intention: a speaker cannot (successfully) utter a commissive 
without intending to make the propositional content expressed therein obtain.  ‘Swear,’ 
‘promise,’ ‘vow,’ and ‘pledge’ all carry the commissive illocutionary force: ‘I swear to 
tell the truth’ is an utterance that commits the speaker to doing something; namely: 
telling the truth. 
Expressives, such as ‘congratulate’ and ‘thank,’ differ greatly from their 
predecessors.  “The illocutionary point of this class is to express the psychological state 
specified in the sincerity condition about a state of affairs specified in the propositional 
content” (Searle 1979, 15).  Expressives have no direction of fit, since the truth of the 
proposition expressed must be presupposed, and their sincerity condition is a variable 
ranging over “the different possible psychological states expressed in the performance of 
the illocutionary acts in this class” (Searle 1979, 16).  So when one utters ‘Thank you,’ 
one is expressing the fact that they feel gratitude toward the hearer.  
 The final, and most pertinent to our discussion, is the declarative illocutionary 
force.  Among declarations we find utterances such as ‘You’re fired,’ ‘I quit,’ and ‘I dub 
thee N.N.’  The illocutionary point of declarations is to make something the case; Searle 
16 
claims that “it is the defining characteristic of this class that the successful performance 
of one of its members brings about the correspondence between the propositional 
content and reality, successful performance guarantees that the propositional content 
corresponds to the world” (Searle, 1979 16-17).  While directives and commissives seek 
to make the world match the proposition expressed via an agent (either hearer or 
speaker), declarations have no direction of fit precisely because they require no such 
agent—the successful utterance of ‘I quit’ makes it such that the speaker has quit: the 
world matches the words of the utterance in virtue of their (successful) utterance alone.  
In Expression and Meaning, Searle claims that declarations have no sincerity conditions; 
he later changes his mind however and claims that declarations can only be successfully 
uttered if the speaker both believes that she has the power she is invoking (e.g. the power 
to baptize an object), and the desire to “bring about the state of affairs represented” by 
her utterance (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 57).  The latter, two-fold sincerity 
condition is more plausible, as this conforms with the fact (acknowledged by both 
Austin and Searle) that declarations are, with few exceptions, governed by conventions.  
An utterance of ‘You’re out’ in a major league baseball game is not a declaration when 
the speaker is the shortstop—since this speaker cannot believe that he can bring this state 
of affairs about in virtue of his utterance.  When the speaker is the umpire, however, 
‘You’re out’ makes the base-runner out.  The umpire’s utterance carries this power and 
weight in virtue of the umpire’s (true) belief that he can call runners out and his desire to 
utter a declarative or make something the case.11  When the shortstop utters ‘You’re out’ 
                                                 
11 The notion of desire used here is a weak one and it is not intended to capture all our intuitions.  There 
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the utterance has an assertive illocutionary force: it expresses the shortstop’s belief that 
the base-runner is out; when the umpire utters ‘You’re out’ the player is out, whether the 
instant replay proves the umpire right or not; it is the umpire’s successful uttering of 
‘You’re out’ that makes the base-runner out, not an objective fact about relations 
between the base-runner, base-player, and ball.12
 In Foundations of Illocutionary Logic, Searle significantly alters the 
characteristics of illocutionary acts, though his taxonomy follows the same mechanism 
just outlined.  Two significant things happen to the taxonomy in the period between 
1979 and 1985: first, direction of fit ostensibly falls out of the characteristics of an 
illocutionary act; second, the twelve criteria condense to seven.  This latter change is a 
good one for the reader, as the seven are much more precise than the twelve—though 
they still are not as pellucid as some might like.  The former change is not desirable and 
its motivation is not apparent: though the new “seven components of illocutionary force” 
do not include direction of fit when they are given to the reader on pages 12-20, 
direction of fit shows up as central to the classification and derivation of the five 
illocutionary points on pages 52-62.  Direction of fit does not make it into the 
components of illocutionary force, though we are told that “the five different 
                                                                                                                                                
are certainly many cases where a speaker must utter a declarative, though she does not want to (e.g., say 
the umpire is a die-hard Red Sox fan and the player he is calling out is a Red Sox player). Our notion of 
desire needs to accommodate these sorts of cases and Searle’s claim that “the psychological states 
expressed in all declarations are belief and desire.  A speaker who declares that P expresses 
simultaneously his desire to bring about the state of affairs represented by P and his belief that his 
utterance is bringing it about” (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 57-58).  The umpire’s desire to call the 
runner out is small, but she must have one.  If P is the state of affairs in which the runner is out, the umpire 
desires to bring about P in virtue of another desire to be an honest umpire.  This desire commits her to 
desiring to bring about any state of affairs which she, as an expert, thinks should obtain. 
12 Of course an umpire can be overruled by a fellow umpire or made to change his or her mind by an irate 
player or coach, but in ordinary circumstances the umpire’s calling a player out makes the player out. 
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illocutionary points exhaust the different possible directions of fit between the 
propositional content and the world,” (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 53) so it is clearly 
still central to illocutionary force.   
 Searle might want to minimize direction of fit because, as he admits in 
Expression, while there are only four directions of fit there are five illocutionary forces.  
The taxonomy would be strengthened if there were a one-to-one correspondence 
between illocutionary forces and direction of fit.  Though reducing the two forces with a 
world-to-word direction of fit would be optimal, Searle’s inability to do this does not 
provide a sufficient reason to push direction of fit out of the components of illocutionary 
force. We are here interested in determining whether one type of utterance (storytelling) 
can be said to be an extension of another type of utterance (baptism).  In order to 
determine this we will need to be able to classify the two speech acts very precisely; this 
is the reason for favoring the taxonomy of Foundations over that of Expression—but a 
taxonomy that incorporates both will suit our purposes better than either in isolation. 
 The taxonomy ought to be understood as dividing up utterances in two ways.  
First, given an utterance, we use (i)-(iii) to make a rough-grained classification, to put 
the utterance under an illocutionary force.  This is to distinguish ‘It rained today’ from 
‘Loan me a dollar’—it is to sort the assertives from the directives, etc.  Once we have 
determined that an utterance is, e.g., an assertive, we are in a position to decide if the 
utterance needs to be further classified.  If so, we can make the fine-grained 
classifications within the assertive force: we tell guesses from assertions and assertions 
from testimony using the five components of illocutionary force.  These two types of 
19 
classification are distinct and have as an analogy the distinction between classifying 
animals by genus (illocutionary force) and classifying them by species (illocutionary 
acts).  To be certain, a full scientific or philosophical analysis of a speech act will require 
both classifications, and the genus/force classification must precede the species/act 
classification; however, the rough-grained classification will often suffice as a stopping 
point for classification: just as knowing that an animal is a monkey (without knowing 
that it is a vervet monkey) is often sufficient, so too does knowing that an utterance is an 
assertive rather than a directive often do the job. 
 The classification of an illocutionary act is a pragmatic thing, often done on the 
fly.  Illocutionary force is tied directly to meaning, and classifying an illocutionary act is 
closely related to determining its meaning.  When a husband says to his wife ‘We just 
don’t understand each other anymore,’ she needs to know whether this is an observation 
on his part or a suggestion that they need to change their ways; when a mother tells a 
daughter to clean her room, it is important that the daughter know whether it is a 
suggestion, request, or order.  The case of the couple is one in which a hearer needs to 
determine the illocutionary force of the utterance: is he asserting P or suggesting that we 
do Q?  The case of the mother and daughter is one in which the hearer needs to make a 
distinction between two illocutionary acts: is she suggesting this or ordering it?  These 
are two different uses of the taxonomy which, as such, have not been recognized by 
Searle.  His taxonomy does allow for the ambiguity in both situations to be resolved, but 
it requires the same process in both when an abbreviated version would be more 
appropriate for the first (the couple).  For this reason, we ought to take Searle’s insight in 
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Expression that illocutionary point, direction of fit, and sincerity conditions are central to 
illocutionary force as seriously as we take the insight in Foundations that there are five 
other components that identify individual acts within a force.  The taxonomic 
mechanism then ought to consist of a rough-grained sorting of illocutionary force that 
first groups illocutions according to the five categories (based on point, direction of fit, 
and sincerity conditions) then, when necessary, a fine-grained sorting of illocutionary 
verbs and utterances into illocutionary acts (based on (1)-(5) presented below) can be 
used to distinguish any two different illocutionary acts that share a force from one 
another.  In what follows I will spell out the fine-grained sorting mechanism; we will 
then employ this two-tiered mechanism for the rest of our discussion of ‘baptism’ and 
‘storytelling.’ 
 In Foundations, Searle claims that there are seven components of illocutionary 
force: illocutionary point, degree of strength of illocutionary point, mode of achievement 
of illocutionary point, propositional content conditions, preparatory conditions, sincerity 
conditions, and degree of sincerity conditions.  In our interpretation of this taxonomy, 
illocutionary point and sincerity conditions have will have been taken into account by 
the time the components of illocutionary force are used, so we will leave those out at this 
step and instead focus on the other 5 components.13
 (1) Degree of strength of illocutionary point: The amount of force accompanying 
an utterance; e.g. begging is a much stronger way for a speaker to try to get something 
than requesting. 
                                                 
13 Our numbering will then differ from Searle’s. 
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 (2) Mode of achievement of illocutionary point: Any special conditions which 
must be met for a successful utterance of that illocution; the speaker who utters ‘Drop 
and give me twenty’ must be in a special position of authority over a hearer for the 
utterance to be successful, assuming that the hearer is an ordinary individual and is not 
renowned for her willingness to demonstrate her athletic prowess. 
 (3) Propositional content conditions: Limitations on what can be said within a 
given illocutionary force; one cannot say “’I order you to have eaten beans last week’” 
(Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 16) because of constraints on the propositional content 
of directives; likewise, one cannot promise to punch the hearer in the face (under 
ordinary circumstances), since this is doubtless not in the interest of the hearer, though 
one can well threaten to do just this.  
 (4) Preparatory conditions: Conditions that must obtain if the utterance is to be 
successful; for example: the ability for the hearer of a directive to make the propositional 
content obtain or that there be evidence a hearer can reference when a speaker asserts 
that they have proven something. 
 (5) Degree of strength of sincerity conditions: The degree to which one e.g. 
believes the propositional content of an assertion; a key difference between ‘testifying 
that P,’ ‘asserting that P,’ ‘suggesting that P,’ and ‘guessing that P’ is that one can 
believe P less as one progresses from ‘testifying’ to ‘guessing.’ 
 We know that ‘I dub thee N.N.’ and ‘I quit’ are utterances with the illocutionary 
force of declaratives in virtue of their illocutionary point, direction of fit, and sincerity 
conditions; we know that the utterances do not mean the same thing (that one attaches a 
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name to an object and the other terminates the speaker’s employment) because, 
minimally, we know that the preparatory conditions for the two are different.  
Classifying these utterances as declaratives uses the rough-grained classifying 
mechanism of (i)-(iii).  Classifying ‘I dub thee N.N.’ and ‘I quit’ as two distinct 
illocutionary acts requires the fine-grained mechanism of (1)-(5).  It must typically be 
the case that the speaker has the authority of an institution to baptize another person, but 
there is no such requirement for a successful utterance of ‘I quit.’  If one person ‘insists 
that A’ and another ‘requests that A,’ the two differ in degree of strength of illocutionary 
point, preparatory conditions, and (possibly) propositional content conditions; insisting 
and requesting are therefore not the same illocutionary act, though they are both 
directives.  We can likewise determine two illocutionary acts to be identical just in case 
we can ascertain that they have the same illocutionary force and are identical in all five 
components of illocutionary force. 
 Though Searle does not address the issue of speech act extension directly, he 
does recognize that something like extension can happen to illocutionary acts.  
Illocutionary acts are propositions (or propositional content) expressed with a particular 
illocutionary force.  Searle introduces a notation to symbolize this relationship, F(P), 
wherein F is the illocutionary force behind the utterance and P the propositional content 
of the utterance.  The purpose of this notation is to eliminate confusion when talking 
about illocutionary commitment and indirect speech acts.  One utterance, e.g., ‘Can you 
reach the salt?’ might mean both the ordinary directive and another directive such as 
‘Pass the salt.’  In this case, F1(P1) is an utterance with the propositional content (P1) of 
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‘Can you reach the salt?’ and the force (F1) of a directive, i.e., a question about the 
hearer’s ability to reach the salt.  However, this utterance might, and often does, mean 
that the speaker wants the hearer to pass the salt, so the utterance also has the 
propositional content (P2) of ‘Pass the salt’ and the force (F2) of a directive, i.e., a 
request.  Searle tells us: 
 an illocutionary act of the form F1(P1) commits the speaker to an illocutionary 
act F2(P2) iff in the successful performance of F1(P1): 
(A) The speaker achieves (strong) or is committed (weak) to the illocutionary 
point of F2 on P2 with the required mode of achievement and degree of 
strength of F2. 
(B) He is committed to all the preparatory conditions of F2(P2) and to the 
propositional presuppositions. 
(C) He commits himself to having the psychological state specified by the 
sincerity conditions of F2(P2) with the required degree of strength. 
(D) P2 satisfies the propositional content of F2 with respect to the context of 
utterance. (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 24)14 
Searle suggests that one can only be committed to an illocutionary act strongly or 
weakly: strong illocutionary commitments are the illocutionary acts that a speaker 
performed in virtue of performing another speech act while weak illocutionary 
commitments are those that are inferred from an utterance.  In this chapter I present an 
exposition of Searle’s discussion of weak and strong illocutionary commitment; this 
discussion will serve as a framework for our evaluation of Zalta’s argument. 
 Strong illocutionary commitments are rather straightforward: when a speaker 
utters ‘I know John ran a four-minute mile’ she has asserted that she has knowledge 
about an event and she has asserted that this event occurred—that John has indeed run a 
four-minute mile.  Likewise, when a judge says ‘I order you to appear before the court 
                                                 
14 (A)-(D) are (1)-(4) in Searle; they have been changed here to avoid confusion with the five components 
of illocutionary force. 
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on Tuesday,’ her utterance has the illocutionary point of ordering the defendant to 
appear before court and carries the strong illocutionary commitment of giving the 
defendant permission to appear before the court.  Strong illocutionary commitments are 
easiest to see in cases where one illocutionary verb is just a stronger version of another: 
‘begging’ is strongly committed to ‘asking’ because you cannot beg for something 
without asking for it as well; likewise ‘swearing’ implies ‘promising,’ and ‘insisting’ 
‘asserting.’  But there are also cases of strong illocutionary commitment where F1(P1) is 
of a different illocutionary force than F2(P2): ‘Shut the door’ is a directive that commits 
the speaker to an assertive equivalent to ‘The door is open,’ else there would be no need 
to order the hearer to shut the door. 
 It is clear that strong illocutionary commitment meets Searle’s (A)-(D) above.  
Since strong illocutionary commitment is characterized as a speaker’s having committed 
an act F2(P2) in virtue of her utterance of act F1(P1), it makes sense to talk about a 
speaker being strongly committed to F2(P2) in virtue of the degree of strength of 
illocutionary commitment of F1(P1) or in virtue of the degree of strength of sincerity 
conditions of F1(P1).  In fact, with the exception of (3) propositional content conditions, 
it is appropriate to talk about strong illocutionary commitment (i.e. extension) in virtue 
of each of the five components of illocutionary force taken individually.  In chapter four 
we will do just this, though this is always shorthand for saying that F1(P1) strongly 
commits the speaker to F2(P2) and the most salient feature of this commitment is e.g. the 
degree of strength of illocutionary commitment, though any case of illocutionary 
commitment must meet all four clauses of the definition proposed by Searle. 
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 Consider a case where a student utters ‘I’m begging you to give me an A’ in the 
context of a discussion with a teacher about a grade.  The student is explicitly begging (a 
directive) and is at the same time committed to a host of other illocutionary acts, 
including a request (another directive) that the teacher give her an A and an assertion 
that she does not already have an A.  This case of strong illocutionary commitment 
meets the four clauses in the following ways.  (A) If F1 is the illocutionary force of 
begging and P1 is the proposition expressed by ‘Give me an A,’ then the speaker has 
achieved F2 (requesting) with the required mode of achievement and degree of strength 
because doing so is part of achieving F1; an analogy here is counting: in the process of 
successfully counting to a number n ≥ 2 one must successfully count to n-1.  (B) The 
preparatory conditions and propositional presuppositions required for F1(P1) include all 
those for the successful utterance of F2(P2), so this condition is satisfied.  (C) The same 
reasoning shows that this condition is satisfied as well, since a stronger desire is needed 
to successfully beg than is needed to successfully request.  Finally, (D) in this case P2 
does satisfy the propositional content of F2, as one can certainly utter a weak directive, 
such as requesting, on a propositional content if one can successfully utter a stronger 
directive, begging, on the same propositional content. 
 The notion of weak illocutionary commitment encompasses both indirect speech 
acts and conversational implicature.15  To explain weak illocutionary commitment, 
Searle gives the following example: 
                                                 
15 What is said here of indirect speech acts holds of conversational implicature.  See Recanati 1987, 121-
126 for arguments that “indirect speech acts are nothing but a special case of conversational implicature, 
where the speaker’s intention to perform the indirect speech act is conversationally implicated by his 
performance of the direct speech act” (Recanati 2001, 266).  For a discussion of conversational 
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 Student X: Let’s go to the movies tonight. 
 Student Y: I have to study for an exam. (Searle 1979, 33) 
Student Y has explicitly uttered an assertive, but if Y’s response stopped there it would 
be wholly inadequate, it would not be an appropriate response to X’s directive.  In order 
for Student Y’s response to make sense in the context she must be committed to a 
directive to the effect of ‘I cannot go to the movies tonight’ (this is a directive because it 
is the rejection of an offer, which is a directive).  The assertive in this case, while 
explicit and therefore “literal”, is secondary, and the directive is “indirect” but primary 
(Searle 1979, 34).  The class of weak illocutionary commitments is larger and more 
variegated than their strong counterparts.  While there are standard, exemplar cases of 
weak illocutionary commitment (the question ‘Can you pass the salt?’ has as its primary 
meaning, almost without exception, an indirect request), their reliance on context and 
conventions makes the workings of weak illocutionary commitments less obvious than 
those of strong illocutionary commitments. 
In the case of Student Y’s utterance we are concerned with showing that Y’s 
primary illocutionary act is the rejection of X’s offer; F1 is the illocutionary force of 
assertion and P1 is the proposition expressed by ‘I have to study for an exam’ while F2 is 
the illocutionary force of a directive and P2 is the propositional content of ‘I cannot go to 
the movies tonight:’ (A) Y is committed to F2 on P2 if F1(P1) is to count as a adequate 
reply to X and Y has the required mode of achievement and degree of strength for F2—
since Y is able to determine what she will or will not do this evening and, presumably, 
                                                                                                                                                
implicature more generally, see Grice 2001.  Martinich 2001 suggests that indirect speech acts can  be 
understood within the framework of conversational implicature when he uses Grice’s maxims to argue that 
storytelling is not an illocutionary act that weakly commits an author to a directive such as ‘I order you to 
imagine P’. 
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intends her reply to be an appropriate response to X, we can conclude that Y’s utterance 
meets this criterion; (B) she is likewise committed to the preparatory conditions and 
propositional presuppositions of F2(P2), namely she is committed to the truth of the 
assertions regarding her having an exam and her inability to simultaneously study and 
watch a movie;  (C) Y has a desire to reject X’s offer; and (D) P2 satisfies the 
propositional content of F2, that is to say P2 is a state of affairs that X can bring about 
(namely the state of affairs wherein X does not ask Y to do anything else this evening). 
28 
CHAPTER III 
STORYTELLING AND STANDARD BAPTISM 
Zalta is concerned with showing that storytelling is an extension of baptism, that 
the notion of ‘baptism’ ought to encompass a group of acts rather than the one single act 
(characterized by the utterance ‘I dub thee N.N.’) traditionally associated with the term 
and this group of acts ought to include storytelling utterances as well.16  On the face of it, 
this proposal is trivial: it would be short sighted indeed to believe that every name in the 
world was bestowed upon its bearer via an utterance of ‘I dub thee N.N.’  Though there 
are many reasons think the class of baptismal utterances broader than the exemplar case, 
the most obvious are that this is clearly the stilted language of philosophical discourse 
and not the sort of sentence the average person would ever utter and that this view would 
assume that everyone is baptized in English.  The idea of a or the standard baptismal 
locution is not to be taken seriously; rather, this locution is to be taken as a model for the 
type of act required to baptize an individual.  While this exact utterance is not necessary 
to establish reference, it follows a formula that characterizes the (still rather narrow) 
class of baptismal locutions.  The standard philosophical notion of ‘baptism’ requires 
simply that a name be connected with an individual by way of a causal interaction 
between the speaker and the named.  Within this notion there is a natural bias toward 
                                                 
16 One might wonder if Zalta needs to make this argument at all: perhaps Searle’s account of storytelling 
can be adapted to suit Zalta’s ontology.  However, Searle’s theory is a variation on pretense theory (see 
Searle 1969).  Searle argues that storytelling utterances are staged utterances of other speech acts, not a 
speech act of their own, and it is hard to see how this could be adapted to ground the reference of fictional 
names to abstract objects.  In Zalta 2000, Zalta argues that his own ontology (which he there calls object 
theory) and pretense theory can be reconciled, but (a) this requires a deviation from the Meinongian 
ontology, (b) the viability of this move is doubtful, and (c) evaluating this option fully would take us 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
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ordinary objects, however: the act of naming is typically taken to involve an ostensive 
reference to the named, usually taken to be some sort of gesture made in the presence of 
the named, and nonexistent objects cannot be so referred to.  An utterance can deviate 
greatly from ‘I dub thee N.N.’ but still count as ‘baptismal’ if it follows this general 
pattern.  Zalta tries to show that ‘storytelling’ follows this pattern, ostensibly picking out 
fictional characters in the process.  An utterance of ‘N.N.’ by a parent in response to a 
nurse’s utterance of ‘What will the little one’s name be?’ is taken as a baptismal 
utterance, even if the child is not in the room at the time of utterance.  We actually let a 
broad range of utterances count as baptismal, so Zalta’s suggestion that we take 
‘baptism’ as a class of utterances that is broader than the standard, exemplar utterance is 
in fact already heeded.  However, it is not clear that ‘storytelling’ is similar enough to 
any utterance typically accepted as baptismal to warrant Zalta’s proposed extension.   
In formulating a definition of the notion of extension we can take cues from 
Zalta’s argument for the extension of baptism.  Zalta argues from the following 
observations to the conclusion that storytelling is an extended baptism: 
1. ‘I dub thee N.N.’ is “a speech act more like proposing a definition than 
asserting something about the object being baptized;” 
2. within the theory of abstract objects, storytelling “is a speech act more similar 
to definition than assertion;” and 
3. while in a standard baptism a name need only be used once, in storytelling the 
name is used repeatedly. (Zalta 2003, 7-8) 
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The notion of extension used here focuses on both type of speech act and length of 
utterance.  Zalta does not spell out this notion, but from the argument just given, it 
appears that Zalta might like to try the following definition: 
(Df1) Speech act a* extends another speech act a just in case (i) a* and a share an 
illocutionary force and (ii) a* is longer than a.17
This definition cannot be accepted because it is not suitably precise to determine that 
storytelling is an extended baptism without also allowing that storytelling is an extended 
resignation, blessing, and excommunication (as these share an illocutionary force and all 
are, characteristically, shorter than stories).  There are problems with both clauses of this 
definition.  One obvious problem is that (i) uses the entirely too broad notion of 
illocutionary force, and illocutionary force does not group illocutionary acts closely 
enough for this purpose.  In what follows we will use the five components of 
illocutionary force to try to find a replacement clause (or clauses) for (i).  This alone will 
not fix the definition; an evaluation of (ii) will show that length of utterance, word 
repetition, etc. have nothing to do with an utterances classification as a particular speech 
act, so (ii) must be amended or rejected as well. 
Any notion of extension derived from the components of illocutionary force will 
rely heavily on the idea of one illocutionary act accomplishing another by being stronger 
or larger or broader than the other.  So ‘asserting’ is extended by ‘testifying’ in relation 
to the five components of illocutionary force because, to put it roughly, ‘testifying’ is a 
                                                 
17 ‘Longer than’ might need to defined as well: though it is intended in a non-technical sense we could take 
it that utterance x is ‘longer than’ utterance y iff x has more syllables than y. 
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stronger illocutionary act than ‘asserting:’ ‘testifying P’ is a way to ‘assert P’ and more.  
We might then amend (i) in our definition of extension as follows: 
(Df2) Speech act a* extends another act a just in case (i) a speaker who 
successfully performs a* will also perform a and (ii) a* is longer than a.  
Clause (i) fits the description of strong illocutionary commitment; this suggests that (i) is 
a good clause for our definition.  Before we embark on a discussion of Searle’s notion of 
illocutionary commitment and its applicability to baptism and storytelling we need to 
deal with clause (ii) of the notion of extension.  It seems that we might be able to 
squeeze something like (ii) in under (3)’s propositional content conditions.  Length is 
clearly a key factor in distinguishing storytelling from a standard baptism; though 
removal of this difference might not make storytelling identical to standard baptism, it 
would certainly help in making Zalta’s case.  The Meinongian might suggest that 
storytelling extends baptism via propositional content conditions because storytelling 
allows for greater propositional content than standard baptism: storytelling does more 
than standard baptizing because it baptizes on a grander scale—consider Zalta’s 
assertion that “an author simultaneously baptizes both a story and its characters through 
a storytelling,” (Zalta 2003, 9) and the fact that “the characters of a story are the objects 
which exemplify properties according to it[: . . .] any story objects, not just real or 
imaginary persons or animals” (Zalta 1983, 92).  But it cannot be the case that 
storytelling is an extended baptism simply by virtue of its having more propositional 
content than baptism. 
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 To see why the sheer length of storytelling alone fails to make it an extended 
baptism consider the illocutionary act of a ‘christening’ or Christian baptism.  There are 
a wide range of illocutions that count as christening locutions; these differ not in content 
but in length of utterance.  ‘You are hereby baptized’ will suffice to baptize an 
individual under the right circumstances.  If length of propositional content were enough 
to justify a claim that one illocutionary act extends another, it seems reasonable to think 
that if any two illocutionary acts differ significantly in length we ought to consider them 
two distinct acts of which one is the extension of the other.  But then ‘You are hereby 
baptized’ would be a different illocutionary act than a long baptism wherein the speaker 
utters ‘. . . I baptize you my brother/sister in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy 
Ghost; buried with Christ in baptism, raised to walk in the newness of life . . ..’  If these 
two do not differ greatly enough to warrant the introduction of distinct illocutionary acts, 
then surely the 12 page long Episcopal baptismal service ought to differ enough from 
‘You are hereby baptized’ to be an extension of said utterance if anything does.  But it 
does not.  This point is further illustrated by considering another example.  Many high 
school students find themselves writing a report in the course of their studies.  Their 
skills are not very well developed, so the teacher usually requires a report of, say, 1500 
words.  The paper the students turn in should be considered a reporting speech act.  
Now, consider all 336 pages of The Starr Report: The Official Report of the Independent 
Counsel’s Investigation of the President.  We have no problem recognizing that both 
utterances are reports, though the one is clearly longer than the other.  Again, if the 
length of utterance alone does determine a difference between speech acts, it must do so 
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in this example.  But again, these two are reports.  So, length of utterance alone neither 
belongs in (3) nor serves to differentiate illocutionary acts; though the disparity in length 
between ‘You are hereby baptized’ and the Episcopal baptismal service does serve to 
differentiate utterance acts, it bears no significance on illocutionary acts.  Clause (ii) in 
our definition is then a red herring; amending our notion of extension to reflect this gives 
us: 
(Df3) Speech act a* extends another act a just in case a speaker who successfully 
performs a* will also perform a. 
The five illocutionary forces are too broad for us to say that if any two acts a and 
a* share a force, a* is an extension of a: we would not say, for example, that ‘refusing’ 
is an extension of ‘accepting’ or ‘begging’ of ‘warning,’ though the former are both 
commissives and the latter both directives.  Since illocutionary forces are so clearly 
delineated by Searle’s five components (and are given their identity conditions by said 
components) it seems that the logical way for one act to extend another would be found 
here.  
 (1) Degree of strength of illocutionary point: ‘Asking’ and ‘commanding’ differ 
in regards to degree of strength of illocutionary point.  ‘Asking P’ and ‘commanding P’ 
are both attempts to get a hearer to bring P about and are both therefore directives; but 
‘commanding’ is a stronger way to achieve this point than ‘asking.’  ‘Commanding’ 
might then be understood as an ‘extended asking.’  To ‘beg for x’ is a very strong way to 
‘ask for x,’ similarly, to ‘guess y’ is weak way to ‘assert y.’  By contrast, to ‘tell a story 
about N.N.’ is not a strong way to ‘baptize N.N.,’ nor is to ‘baptize N.N.’ a weak way to 
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‘tell a story about N.N.,’ if we continue to take a story to be a fictional thing.  The degree 
of strength relationship is not symmetrical—‘beg’ is a stronger way to ‘ask,’ but ‘ask’ is 
not a stronger way to ‘beg.’  But every degree of strength relationship implies a converse 
degree of strength relationship—since ‘beg’ is a stronger way to ‘ask,’ ‘ask’ is a weaker 
way to ‘beg.’  Since ‘storytelling’ is a supposed extension of ‘baptism,’ we will assume 
that ‘storytelling’ is a stronger way to ‘baptize’ an object.  But we cannot then say that 
‘baptizing’ is a weaker way to accomplish ‘storytelling,’ so these two illocutionary acts 
cannot lie on an spectrum of degree of strength of illocutionary force in the way that 
‘ask’ and ‘beg’ do: ‘storytelling’ cannot extend ‘baptism’ via degree of strength of 
illocutionary force.  As further support for this claim consider Searle’s assertion that for 
declarations the “degree of strength of illocutionary point [. . . is] null” (Searle and 
Vanderveken 1985, 61): the degree of strength of illocutionary point for a declaration, 
such as ‘baptize’ is either ‘yes’ or ‘no,’ either it works or it does not, and ‘storytelling,’ 
if it turns out to be a declaration at all, would have the same null degree of strength of 
illocutionary point, so one clearly cannot be greater than the other.  Therefore, 
‘storytelling’ cannot extend ‘baptism’ in this way via degree of strength of illocutionary 
point.  
 (2) Mode of achievement of illocutionary point: In his discussion of the mode of 
achievement of illocutionary point, Searle claims that “some, but not all, illocutionary 
acts require a special way or special set of conditions under which their illocutionary 
point has to be achieved in the performance of a speech act,” (Searle and Vanderveken 
1985, 15) and he offers as an example the fact that an order must be given under certain 
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conditions if it is to be distinguished from a request (the speaker must be in a position of 
authority over the hearer for a directive to count as an order).  Taking this lead from 
Searle and mirroring the discussion of degree of strength of illocutionary point above, 
we might well suppose that a speech act a* extends speech act a via mode of 
achievement of illocutionary point just in case the mode of achievement of a* includes 
the mode of achievement of a.  The mode of achievement of illocutionary point most 
often depends on the relations between speaker and hearer and the facts about the 
context of their discourse.  In the discussion of We can say that ‘order’ strongly commits 
one to ‘suggest’ because when a speaker is in the position to ‘order’ a hearer, that person 
is also in a position to ‘suggest’ the person to do the same thing.  If a father says to his 
daughter, ‘You must clean your room this Saturday,’ he has committed himself to 
suggesting that she clean her room (a weaker act) in virtue of a stronger utterance that he 
has the power to make because he is her parent, though he could well have simply 
suggested it to her.  Similarly, when a judge says, ‘I order you to appear before the 
court,’ she has ‘ordered’ the accused to come to court, but she has also ‘permitted’ the 
accused to do the same; though she could have just ‘permitted’ the accused to appear 
before the court, she uses the stronger illocution, and this illocution is only at her 
disposal because of her status in relation to the hearer.  (The judge could not order the 
defense lawyer to cut her lawn because she has no authority so to do—though she could 
ask this of him or her, the judge’s utterance cannot be an ordering illocutionary act.) 
To argue that storytelling extends baptizing in virtue of the mode of achievement 
of illocutionary point, Zalta might try to use an analogy with the previously described 
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relationship between order and suggest.  That is, he might argue that just as one must 
have greater credentials, so to speak, to order than one does to suggest, a speaker needs 
greater credentials to tell a story than to baptize.  Searle tells us that “all declarative 
illocutionary forces have the mode of achievement that the speaker invokes his power or 
authority to perform the declaration,” (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 57) so perhaps the 
power of an author is similar to the power of a parent or judge.  An important feature in 
the relationship between order and suggest is that, in our example, the father was able to 
choose between suggesting that his daughter clean her room and ordering her so to do.  
This feature is not unique to our example.  Other utterance pairs that have this 
relationship include argue/assert, swear/commit, and beg/request.18
In the case of ‘storytelling,’ however, Doyle could not choose to simply ‘baptize’ 
Holmes rather than tell a story about him—since it is a consequence of Zalta’s notion of 
‘storytelling’ that the only way to baptize a character is through telling a story about it.  
That a speaker in a certain position can choose to utter illocutionary act a or the stronger 
illocutionary act a* is a central to a*s extending a.  Or: a* strongly commits a speaker to 
a in virtue of mode of achievement of preparatory conditions iff the speaker could, all 
other things being equal, choose to use a rather than a*.  We know that if a speaker 
could ‘order’ something she could also ‘ask’ for it and, ignoring the other components of 
illocutionary force, she would have achieved the same end.   
(3) Propositional content conditions: Clause (D) of Searle’s definition of 
illocutionary commitment claims that when a speaker utters F1(P1) she is committed to 
                                                 
18 See Searle and Vanderveken 1985, “Appendix I: Semantic Tableaux for Illocutionary Commitment” for 
further discussion. 
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an utterance of F2(P2) if clauses (A)-(C) hold of the utterance and “P2 satisfies the 
propositional content of F2 with respect to the context of utterance” (Searle and 
Vanderveken 1985, 24).19  The propositional content conditions on P for a given force F 
are, roughly, the conditions that determine whether P is the type of thing which you can 
F.  For example, “if a speaker makes a promise, the content of the promise must be that 
the speaker will perform some future course of action.  One cannot promise that 
someone else will do something (though one can promise to see to it that he does it) and 
one cannot promise to have done something in the past” (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 
16).  Likewise, one cannot apologize for something over which he or she had no control 
(Searle gives us the example of modus ponens).  It is difficult to see exactly how two 
illocutionary acts a and a* must relate to one another if the utterance of a* strongly 
commits a speaker to a.  The requirements of clause (D) do not mention F1(P1) but are 
limited to F2(P2).  However, it is safe to say that, even in a case of strong illocutionary 
commitment, the propositional content conditions on P2 need not have any relation to 
those on P1.  As an example take ‘I promise to tell the truth’ as F1(P1) and ‘I know 
something you would like to hear’ as F2(P2).  F1(P1) has as its most important 
propositional content condition that P1 is in the hearer’s interest,20 but the primary 
propositional content condition for F2(P2) is that P2 is within the realm of things of 
which the speaker can have knowledge.  The one strongly commits the speaker to the 
other—else the speaker would not need to utter the commissive—but the propositional 
content conditions have little, if anything, to do with one another.  Therefore, regarding 
                                                 
19 Following our earlier convention, Searle’s ‘(4)’ is here called ‘(D)’. 
20 See Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 16 and 192. 
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both the general discussion of extension via propositional content conditions—that is, 
extension in virtue of the requirements the illocutionary force places on the propositional 
content of the utterance—and a more specific discussion of the possibility of extending 
‘baptism’ via propositional content conditions, we can conclude that no illocutionary act 
a* can strongly commit a speaker to illocutionary act a in virtue of propositional content 
conditions. 
(4) Preparatory conditions: Preparatory conditions are those conditions that must 
obtain if a speech act is to be performed successfully and nondefectivly; “for example, a 
promise differs from a threat in that the act promised must be for the hearer’s benefit. [. . 
. And] a speaker must satisfy the preparatory condition of being in a position of authority 
before he can nondefectively issue an utterance with the mode of achievement of a 
command” (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 18).  Preparatory conditions are often, but 
not always, shared by an entire illocutionary force: “all acts whose point is to get the 
hearer to do something—orders, requests, commands, etc.—have as a preparatory 
condition that the hearer is able to do the act directed” (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 
17-18).  Obviously, any preparatory conditions that are shared by the whole illocutionary 
force must be shared by two illocutionary acts if one is to count as the extension of the 
other.  We could further generalize the idea of extending via preparatory conditions if, 
mirroring (1) and (2), when we have it that an act a whose preparatory conditions are 
achieved in committing another act a*, we take a to be extended by a* (i.e. a* is an 
extended a).  For example, ‘testifying’ extends ‘asserting’ via preparatory conditions 
because  
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(a) both ‘testifying’ and ‘asserting’ require that a speaker believe he or she has 
knowledge about a subject, and 
(b) ‘testifying’ has the further requirement (preparatory condition) that the 
speaker must “have witnessed the events (or is personally acquainted with 
the facts) represented by his testimony” (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 
188-89). 
An utterance of ‘Clean your room’ both ‘orders’ and ‘suggests’ that the hearer 
clean his or her room, but it also asserts a whole host of propositions—the propositions 
that the preparatory conditions for the hearer cleaning his or her room have obtained.  
The speaker is strongly committed to the assertions that ‘You have a room,’ ‘You are my 
subordinate,’ ‘Your room is dirty,’ etc. when he or she utters ‘Clean your room.’  The 
illocutionary acts (a1, . . ., an) that express the preparatory conditions for another 
illocutionary act b are such that the summation or conjunction of a1, . . .,an will describe 
a state of affairs such that b is easily deduced.  This works in a way similar to beating 
around the bush: when a speaker does not want to tell a hearer something (this is b), she 
utters a series of illocutionary acts (a1, . . ., an) that hint at b or from which b falls out.  
For example, 
a1 = ‘My textbooks are really expensive this semester.’ 
a2 = ‘I can’t believe how much my rent has gone up.’ 
a3 = ‘Have you seen Bill’s new truck?’ 
a4 = ‘My old car has been breaking down a lot lately.’ 
. . . 
an = ‘I’ve been eating Ramen every meal for months.’ 
____ 
b = ‘Can I have some money?’ 
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Similarly, if a speaker went to great lengths to utter all the illocutionary acts that 
describe the preparatory conditions of a speech act b, b will fall out of this long 
utterance.  We could say that ‘order’ extends ‘ask’ because if one listed the assertions of 
all the preparatory conditions for ‘order x’ and ‘ask x,’ one would get to ‘ask’ before 
‘order’ (since ordering requires all the preparatory conditions of ‘ask’ and then some, 
‘ask’ would fall out of the list before ‘order’).  ‘Storytelling’ does not strongly commit a 
speaker to ‘baptizing’ in this way; the preparatory conditions for and mode of 
achievement of illocutionary point of ‘storytelling’ are not over and above those of 
‘baptizing,’ they are just different—if one utters the conjunction of the illocutionary acts 
that express the preparatory conditions for ‘storytelling,’ ‘baptizing’ will never fall out. 
 (5) Degree of strength of sincerity conditions: When considering degree of 
strength of sincerity conditions, we can again take ‘assert’ and ‘guess’ as a paradigm for 
extension or strong illocutionary commitment.  Since ‘assert’ and ‘guess’ are both 
assertives the speaker must believe the proposition expressed by her illocutionary act.21  
However, ‘asserting X’ implies a greater degree of belief than ‘guessing X.’  If a speaker 
‘asserts X,’ we can take it that she believes X, but if she ‘guesses X’ we cannot take it 
that she believes X, only that she thinks X might be true.  The degree of strength of 
sincerity conditions tells us how strongly or weakly one must hold a certain sincerity 
                                                 
21 It should be noted here that our use of the notion of belief is a technical one that might not match up 
with all our intuitions.  There are obviously varying degrees of belief, but Searle might break from our 
intuitions when he suggests that we allow not only the strong convictions that lead to insisting that X  but 
the very weak convictions that accompany a guess (where this belief might be rooted in a hunch that X is 
true, a vague recollection of some knowledge of X, a feeling that X is better than its competitors for some 
reason, etc.).  This notion of belief follows from Searle’s claim that to utter an assertive a speaker must 
have “reasons (or grounds or evidence) that count in favor of or support the truth of the propositional 
content” (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 54). 
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condition in order to successfully utter an illocutionary act.  If we consider the degree of 
belief in X required to ‘guess X,’ ‘assert X,’ and ‘swear that X’ we see that within an 
illocutionary force there is a range of degree of strength of sincerity conditions and if 
one holds a belief of degree n in the proposition expressed by X, an utterance that 
expresses this belief also expresses all the illocutionary acts weaker than this one.  So, if 
one ‘testifies X,’ one has ‘asserted X’ as well, since to testify requires stronger belief 
than to assert. 
 To utter a baptismal illocution one must both believe that one is in a position to 
baptize and desire that the baptized have the name one is about to bestow upon it.22  
There is neither a weak nor a strong form of baptism, since the “degree of strength of 
sincerity conditions [is] null” (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 61).  A speaker either has 
the requisite belief and desire or not.  If not, then no baptism takes place; the baptismal 
utterance is defective, infelicitious, unsuccessful. 
‘Storytelling’ cannot commit a speaker to ‘baptism’ via degree of strength of 
sincerity conditions for two reasons.  First, ‘storytelling’ cannot have a greater degree of 
strength of sincerity conditions than ‘baptism’ because, as Searle tells us, there is no 
room for variation in degree of strength of sincerity conditions for declarations.  Second, 
even if we ignore Searle’s claim about declaratives we must recognize that while the 
belief of ‘assert’ is belief in the propositional content of the utterance and the desire of 
‘order’ is that the propositional content of the utterance obtain, “a speaker who declares 
                                                 
22 Earlier, I suggested that the notion of desire used here is a weak one.  The account given there can be 
adapted to cases where a speaker must baptize an object though does so begrudgingly by the idea of one 
desire (say, the desire to have a child or to not be put in jail for abandoning a child) committing a speaker 
to another (weak) desire. 
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P expresses simultaneously his desire to bring about the state of affairs represented by P 
and his belief that his utterance is bringing it about” (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 57-
58).  Whereas ‘ordering P’ requires more desire that P be brought about by the hearer 
than ‘asking P,’ telling a story S does not require a stronger desire to baptize the 
characters in S than simply ‘baptizing’ them would.  Of course, one cannot simply 
‘baptize’ fictional characters, and this is the problem: ‘storytelling’ does not require 
either a desire to name characters or a belief that one is naming characters; though 
‘storytelling’ may well require a desire to create characters and a belief that one can so 
do, this is not the same as naming, nor can it be taken as an extension of naming. 
We cannot say that ‘storytelling’ commits a speaker to ‘baptizing’ in virtue of 
any of the five components of illocutionary force; moreover, since any strong 
illocutionary commitment that fits the definition offered by Searle in (A)-(D) would 
require a* to commit a speaker to a in virtue of one or more of the five components of 
illocutionary force, we can conclude that a ‘storytelling’ illocutionary act does not 
strongly commit a speaker to a ‘baptizing’ illocutionary act. 
 With the possibility of storytelling being an extended baptism in virtue of a 
storytelling utterance’s strong illocutionary commitment to a baptismal utterance shut 
off to the Meinongian, the remaining option is for storytelling to weakly commit a 
speaker to a baptismal utterance.  As we have seen, Searle’s presentation of weak 
illocutionary commitment could lead a reader to believe that the only sort of weak 
illocutionary commitment is an indirect speech act, but as, e.g., Recanati (2001) argues, 
conversational implicature ought to count as a weak illocutionary commitment as well, 
43 
so there appear to be other types of weak illocutionary commitment.  Once we note the 
similarities between Searle’s presentation of indirect speech acts and the maxims of 
conversational implicature this claim ought to be readily accepted.  The key is to bear in 
mind the hallmark of weak illocutionary commitment is the speaker’s commitment to 
F2(Q) in virtue of an utterance of F1(P).   
 In what follows we will take Zalta’s goal to be to show that a storytelling 
utterance is an indirect declarative; though showing storytelling to be an indirect baptism 
is the ultimate goal, this lesser goal is often easier to work with and if it cannot be 
realized the stronger goal must be unreachable as well.  I will argue that there are certain 
salient characteristics of storytelling utterances—some dependent on Zalta’s conception 
of storytelling—that rule out the possibility of storytelling committing a speaker to a 
declarative.  That is to say, when we look at some consequences of Zalta’s notion of 
storytelling (and our intuitive conception of said notion) we will see that a storytelling 
utterance cannot carry a weak illocutionary commitment to a declarative. 
 Searle tells us that declaratives generally have  
 the mode of achievement that the speaker invokes his power or authority 
to perform the declaration and the general preparatory condition that the 
speaker has the power or authority to change the world by performance of 
the appropriate utterance act. (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 57, 
emphasis added) 
By clause (A) in Searle’s discussion of illocutionary commitment,23 we know that if 
storytelling (F1(P1)) is to weakly commit an author to a baptismal utterance (F2(P2)), 
then the speaker must be “[weakly committed] to the illocutionary point of F2 on P2 with 
                                                 
23 See Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 24. 
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the required mode of achievement” for F2, and by clause (B) we know that the author 
must be “committed to all the preparatory conditions of F2(P2).”  So, if an author is to 
commit herself to a baptismal utterance (or, more generally, a declarative utterance) in 
virtue of a storytelling utterance, she must both possess the authority to change the world 
by uttering the baptismal utterance and invoke this power.  We have already shown that 
the author does not possess the power to baptize fictional characters directly (or by 
strong illocutionary commitment); in what follows we will show that the author cannot 
possess the power required to utter F2(P2), and subsequently that the author cannot 
invoke said power.  The author, then, fails to meet the preparatory conditions and the 
mode of achievement of illocutionary force for a declarative, so storytelling cannot be a 
declarative. 
 The author must, if her storytelling utterances are to carry a commitment to 
declarative utterance(s), possess the power to change the world by virtue of her utterance 
of the appropriate locution.  An appropriate, successful utterance of ‘I quit’ is what 
serves to forfeit the speaker’s job—remember Austin’s original insight that 
performatives (our declaratives) are not themselves reports of, e.g., mental states, but are 
what make a state of affairs obtain in virtue of their successful utterance.  The author 
must, in virtue of her utterance act alone, change the world if storytelling is to weakly 
commit the speaker to a declarative.  Determining exactly what ought to count as the 
utterance act is a difficult matter since the stories with which philosophers generally 
concern themselves are the heavily revised, edited, and polished classics of literature.  
The issue of what counts as a storytelling utterance, exactly which utterances are our 
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alleged declarative utterances, would take a different shape if we concerned ourselves 
with non-commercial stories; ghost stories told around the campfire, the stories told by 
children when playing ‘make-believe,’ and collective fictions such as the Santa myth 
would, if taken as our paradigm cases of storytelling, lead our discussion down different 
paths.  In this discussion of storytelling we are following Hunter and Zalta’s lead and 
talking about the Holmes stories and we can follow Zalta’s general theory of fiction to 
answer our question.      
 The notion of ‘storytelling’ or ‘authoring’ is, for the most part, left to the reader 
in Zalta’s early formulations of his ontology: “we trust that our readers have at least an 
intuitive grasp on what it is to author something” (Zalta 1983, 91).  In Zalta’s later work 
he takes stories to be props, that is, objects which mandate which propositions a reader is 
to imagine as true.  Stories, taken in this way, are like recipes that tell us exactly what to 
imagine and when, if we are to properly understand the story.  With the notion of a story 
as a prop in hand, Zalta can further define the notion of authorship: 
 x authors s iff ∃y[x produces y & y is a prop for s].  (Zalta 2000, 125)24
This just means that Doyle authors the Holmes stories iff he writes the documents which 
say just which propositions are true in the Holmes stories.  This formulation of 
authorship is well and good, but if producing a prop for a particular story is what it 
means to tell that story, the claim that storytelling is an extended baptism cannot be 
made.  The identity conditions for a fictional character are just those properties encoded 
                                                 
24 As I noted earlier, Zalta 2000 seeks to reconcile object theory with pretense theory.  But central to 
pretense theory is the claim that storytelling utterances are staged and Zalta’s adopting a pretense theoretic 
understanding of storytelling would preemptively undermine his attempts to argue that storytelling is an 
indirect declarative. 
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by the abstract object that is that character encodes, viz., all and only those properties 
which are attributed to the character in the story in which the character is native.  So 
Holmes, an abstract object, encodes the property ‘smoking a pipe’ and not the property 
‘having said “Elementary, my dear Watson,”’ since the former is attributed to him in the 
Holmes stories and the latter only in subsequent writing by authors other than Doyle.  
Zalta makes it clear that the canonical Holmes stories are what determine the identity of 
Holmes.  We ought then to conclude that, within the framework established by Zalta, the 
utterances with whose weak illocutionary commitment we should be concerned are those 
published utterances that constitute ‘the stories’ or ‘the book’ or what have you.  To be 
more precise, the canonical Holmes stories are what determine which abstract object is 
our Holmes, which object is picked out by ‘Holmes.’  Now, Zalta does not purport to 
give the exact identity conditions for fictional characters.  Rather, he claims to provide 
“identifying properties” for fictional characters, where “the identifying properties of 
native characters are exactly the properties exemplified by that character in the story” 
(Zalta 1983, 93).  On the face of it, this is a claim that the properties attributed to a 
character in its native story are just the way we pick out characters, though the characters 
may encode other properties we do not use to identify them.  This just means that 
Holmes may encode properties other than those attributed him in the Holmes stories.  
These extra properties could either be properties Doyle failed to mention in the telling of 
Holmes’s exploits or properties which other authors have attributed to Holmes.  But this 
cannot be so.  The identifying properties for fictional characters given in their native 
story must be the stronger identity conditions for that character. 
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 Take any fictional character A and its native story S.  The set of properties 
attributed to A in S will be called A1.  A must be unique, that is, ‘A’ must pick out only 
one abstract object, since if ‘A’ picked out A1 and A2 we would no longer be able to 
evaluate the truth of claims about what happened to A in the story.  The reason for this is 
that the property X might be attributed A in A1 but not in A2, that is, we would not be able 
to say whether X is true or false of A, since ‘A’ might pick out characters that encode 
both X and ~X.  Holmes never said ‘Elementary, my dear Watson,’ but if we let the 
properties attributed Holmes by Doyle in the Holmes stories be merely some of the 
properties Holmes encodes we would not be able to assert this fact.  This would sacrifice 
the clarity the causal theory was to get us in the first place.  ‘Holmes,’ in ordinary 
parlance, refers to the Holmes of Doyle’s stories, just as ‘Lincoln,’ in philosophy 
examples, refers to Abraham Lincoln, the sixteenth President; in other contexts, 
‘Lincoln’ might refer to another Lincoln, likewise, in certain contexts, ‘Holmes’ might 
refer to the Holmes of The Seven-Per-Cent Solution, but part of the appeal of the causal 
theory of reference for fictional characters is that we can be sure that when someone says 
‘Holmes always said “Elementary, my dear Watson,”’ they are speaking falsely, and if 
the properties attributed to Holmes in the Holmes stories do not exhaust the identity of 
Holmes we are no longer guaranteed that an utterance of ‘Holmes always said 
“Elementary, my dear Watson,”’ is false. 
 So Zalta’s claim that storytelling is more like proposing a definition than 
asserting—which we are taking to mean that storytelling utterances are a version of the 
standard declarative baptismal utterance—is a claim about the printed words of a story.  
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This is a plausible delineation of the class of storytelling utterances; we would certainly 
run into problems if we let every utterance by an author in the storytelling process count 
as a storytelling utterance.  Under this approach—where every relevant utterance by an 
author sticks, so to speak, to the story and its characters—an author could not utter a 
proposition ascribing properties to a character and then decide that those properties 
should not identify that character: once they have been uttered, propositions irrevocably 
identify characters.  The utterance acts that compose storytelling on this interpretation 
include utterances made during all parts of the storytelling process, and since this surely 
includes the pre-writing phases, if an author entertains the possibility of attributing a 
property to a character she must actually attribute that property to that character. 
 Zalta is right, then, not to take an approach in which every utterance by the 
author sticks, where every utterance is irrevocable, eternal, and reference or identity 
fixing.  Zalta’s approach above focuses on the prop produced by an author and this is, 
intuitively, the right move to make; however, the implications of this for storytelling do 
not help Zalta’s cause.  In this admission the preparatory conditions for declaratives are 
jeopardized; the author has a chance to rethink or evaluate his or her utterance after it 
has been uttered but before it changes the world, and this is not an opportunity common 
to the speakers of declaratives.  While a bride can mull over her impending utterance of 
‘I do’ and is free to change her mind, she can only do so before the original utterance 
act.  If the act of marrying mirrored storytelling here, the bride would have the ability to 
utter ‘I do’ then decide if she really meant it or if she would like to recant, and this 
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option is certainly not open to the bride.25  Supposing for the time being that storytelling 
utterances are declaratives, the author then has the power to utter whatever she likes and 
then, retrospectively, determine which of her utterances carried the force of a 
declarative—which of her utterances changed the world in virtue of their being 
successful utterances.  Another analogy: if the poker player had the power we are 
granting authors here she could utter ‘Call,’ see the hands of all the other players, then 
determine which, if any, of her bets still count and/or if her utterance of ‘Call’ stuck.  
Now, analogies should not be taken as proof that storytelling is not a declarative, but 
these analogies do serve to point out that storytelling is a rather odd declarative if it is 
one at all: the power afforded the author, under a plausible conception of storytelling, is 
starkly different than the powers afforded speakers of other declaratives. 
 But we are concerned with showing more than that storytelling is an odd 
declarative; our charge is to show that it is no declarative at all.  To this end we will now 
consider a number of ways in which the author, qua speaker, forsakes (or: is forced to 
forsake; or: never achieves) the requisite preparatory condition—we will look at reasons 
why the author does not have the power to change the world by successfully uttering 
storytelling propositions.  An author, if her storytelling utterances are to be declaratives, 
must have the “power or authority to change the world by performance of the 
appropriate utterance act;” two groups of people, editors and scholars, ought to be seen 
as severely restricting the power of storytelling utterances, restricting them to the point 
that the author does not have the power to change the world by mere utterance. 
                                                 
25 Of course marriages can be annulled, but this ought to be viewed as a separate declarative that has 
bearing on a previous declarative rather than a continuation of the initial marrying declarative. 
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 For Zalta the printed word takes a place of authority: Holmes encodes property p 
iff p is attributed Holmes in the Holmes stories, where the Holmes stories consist of all 
and only the stories and books written by Conan Doyle in which Holmes appears.  The 
identity of a fictional character is thus a strict thing, and this is as it should be; we do not 
want nebulous, vague characters floating around.26  Holmes’s identity does not consist of 
only those propositions in the Holmes stories that reference him, be it directly or 
indirectly; rather, it must include every proposition in the Holmes stories.  Since Holmes 
is defined as that character that encodes all the properties attributed Holmes in the 
Holmes stories, and the Holmes stories are defined as (that is: are) the abstract objects 
that encode all and only the propositional properties uttered by Doyle in the telling of the 
Holmes stories (that is, since the identity of the Holmes stories is just as strict as the 
identity of Holmes), any slight change in the propositions encoded by the Holmes stories 
results in a change in Holmes.  Since every property Holmes encodes is critical to 
‘Holmes’ picking out A1 rather than A2, Holmes rather than Sholmes, a change in even 
the most minor proposition expressed in the Holmes stories completely alters the identity 
of Holmes.  Editors are in a position to make (or force authors to make) changes to the 
text, thus altering the identity of the written story by altering its content.  That is, the 
work of editors suggests that authors do not have the power to change the world by 
utterance alone: utterances that ought to be storytelling utterances, that ought to be 
                                                 
26 The sense in which some characters, e.g., Moriarty are vague is not the sense to which we object here.  
Moriarty is an incomplete object—there are lots of things we do not know about him.  However, his 
identity, as an object, is still very clear because the comprehension principle for our Meinongian ontology 
tells us that there is one and only one object which encodes all the properties which are true of Moriarty. 
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declaratives, that ought to have changed the world, are censored by editors.  On this 
count, storytelling is quite different than the other declarative utterances. 
 In order to ensure that authors have the power to change the world by utterance 
alone, Zalta might try to alter the notion of storytelling somewhat.  The problem might 
be avoided by introducing a distinction between kinds of storytelling and say that an 
utterance is a strong storytelling utterance if it is the original creative utterance of an 
author (traditionally conceived), while an utterance is a weak storytelling utterance if it 
is an utterance that determines the final content of a story.  The comments and changes 
of editors, reviewers, and authors would perhaps all be examples of weak storytelling 
utterances.  We might then say that only strong storytelling utterances are baptismal 
utterances.  This distinction, or something like it, seeks to secure the intuition that the 
author is the one doing all the work, that her utterances are the ones that should really 
count.  The author is the one who baptizes characters.  However, this distinction will not 
do the job for Zalta.  Holmes is correctly identified by a close reading of the Holmes 
stories which determines just which propositions are true about Holmes.  These 
propositions are what serves to determine the reference of ‘Holmes.’27  The final, 
published stories must be the utterances that count as baptismal, if any are to do so, and 
this is not the set of strong illocutionary utterances.  On the other hand, if we decide that 
it is the weak storytelling utterances that should count as baptismal, we are left with the 
result that authors, editors, reviewers, etc. are all party to the baptism of a fictional 
character, and this does not gel up with our intuitions about authors and storytelling. 
                                                 
27 Cf. the account of determining the identity of fictional characters in Parsons 1975. 
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 Another option Zalta might pursue is to argue that every utterance which alters 
the content of a story should count as a storytelling utterance, an utterance which serves 
to establish the identity of the fictional characters within that story.  The idea behind this 
move is that we should take the changes as editors as declarative utterances which 
override certain declarative utterances of the author, just as the declarative utterances of 
an annulment override the declaratives of a wedding.  This option leaves Zalta open to 
say that authors do indeed utter declaratives, but editors do too.  However, this option 
too fails to accord with our intuitions that it is the author that does the important work of 
storytelling and character creation.  Editors play no role in Zalta’s account of authorship 
above, and this is, it seems, as it should be. 
 As evidence of the problems posed by editors, consider the case of Thomas 
Wolfe.28  Wolfe is perhaps most famous for his book You Can’t Go Home Again, but 
this work was published posthumously and in a form that greatly differed from Wolfe’s 
original manuscript.  In the December prior to Wolfe’s untimely death, he met with an 
editor at Harper named Edward C. Aswell, turned over a large manuscript, and signed a 
contract to publish the book with Harper.  Wolfe’s friends recall that “Wolfe himself 
arranged and rearranged portions of his unpublished manuscripts and typescripts in his 
large, ubiquitous packing crates, establishing that up to the time of his death his writing 
plans were fluid.”  This leads a scholar on Wolfe to concluded that though “the 
posthumous writings had received a ‘final’ order by Wolfe, [this order was] one which 
[Wolfe] felt he still had to work on for at least a year” (Field 1987, 7).  The manuscript 
                                                 
28 This account comes from Field 1987. 
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handed over at that meeting was approximately one and a half million words and was 
published after Wolfe’s death as two novels, The Web and the Rock and You Can’t Go 
Home Again, and one collection of stories, The Hills Beyond.29  Though there is much 
debate in the world of Wolfe scholarship as to whether the changes Aswell made to the 
text should minimize or override Wolfe’s contribution to the work, the common Wolfe 
reader is not wholly off-base in her belief that Wolfe wrote these works.  Leslie Field’s 
book on Wolfe’s relation to his editors claims to “dispel the myth that Thomas Wolfe’s 
posthumous publications were written by his last editor, Edward C. Aswell.”  Field 
argues that “internal evidence and newly discovered letters prove that Wolfe was the 
writer, Aswell the editor: the posthumous publications are authentic Wolfe works” (xii).  
The case of Thomas Wolfe gives us a solid example of an author whose storytelling 
utterances were drastically overruled by an editor, thereby supporting the claim that 
storytelling utterances cannot be declaratives. 
 Supposing that we ignore the argument that editors negate the storyteller’s power 
and we conclude that the printed word comes from the author complete with the 
requisite power to change the world, we must still acknowledge the power of scholars to 
alter the content of an author’s storytelling utterances; editors alone to not keep the 
author from possessing the power needed to utter declaratives.  Take the case of critical 
editions as an example of the work of scholars.  Often in a critical edition the scholar 
functions as an editor; he or she looks at the published and unpublished versions of the 
manuscript and, in an attempt to honor the original intentions of the author, changes the 
                                                 
29 Field 1987, 17. 
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published text to make it more accurate.  Critical editions seem, at first glance, to try to 
restore power to the author.  Of course, not every story is recreated in a critical edition, 
so critical editions cannot fully restore the power of the author generally.  Call the 
utterances that the author wanted to make but was unable to for whatever reason 
(editorial considerations, deadlines, death, etc.) the intended storytelling utterances.  In 
the case of critical editions it is not always the case that the author’s intended storytelling 
utterances are restored.  The scholar might impose an agenda on the author or misread 
the author’s intentions; either way the content of the story is altered, thus the identity of 
the story and fictional characters are themselves altered.  Even when these critical 
editions do not make it into the public consciousness they have a status of authority; 
critical editions are canonical, they determine the truth or falsity of utterances about 
what went on in a particular story.  Likewise, scholarly interpretations of stories can find 
their way into public consciousness, thus altering the identity of characters or stories.  
Simply put: scholars can change the content of stories, thereby altering the identity of the 
characters native to those stories and this means that the author does not have the final 
say in the identity of his or her characters. 
 At the very least, the evidence suggests that the storytelling utterances of authors 
are vastly different than the paradigmatic declarative utterances of umpires, priests, and 
new parents.  The storytelling utterance is not final, while the standard declarative is.  
This accords with our intuitions that authors ought to be able to change their minds about 
the details of a particular story without, in the process, creating a monstrous character 
that no one, reader or author alike, recognizes or wants to create; however, this implies 
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that storytelling utterances do not meet the preparatory conditions for declaratives: 
storytelling utterances cannot carry a weak illocutionary commitment to baptismal (or, 
more generally, declarative) utterances.30
                                                 
30 It has been suggested that some of the criticisms of Zalta’s theory just raised might be problems for any 
account of fiction.  Our purpose here has been to show that Zalta’s theory, as it stands now, cannot account 
for reference to fictional characters.  The bearing of these arguments on other theories of fiction is of no 
concern to us in this paper, however interesting these results may be in their own right. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
 Hunter’s original charge was that the Meinongian could not reconcile a causal 
theory of reference with his or her ontological take on fictional characters.  Zalta took up 
this challenge by showing that we can take storytelling as an extended baptism, that 
storytelling is like baptism in certain salient respects.  The salient features of a baptism 
are its ostensive quality and that it is a declarative speech act.  Granting Zalta an 
argument that storytelling can fill the ostensive shoes of gesturing in the case of fictional 
characters, the task at hand was to show that storytelling is a declarative utterance.  One 
way to do this was to show that in the process of storytelling one also commits an act of 
baptism; to show this one would show that storytelling utterances carry a strong 
illocutionary commitment to baptismal utterances.  We have shown that this is not the 
case using Searle’s taxonomy of illocutionary acts.  The other option for Zalta is to show 
that storytelling carries a weak illocutionary commitment to baptismal utterances—that a 
baptism is implied in an act of storytelling in the same way that ‘Pass the salt’ is implied 
in ‘Can you reach the salt?’; but as we have just shown, the notion of storytelling does 
not permit an author to achieve the preparatory conditions or mode of achievement of 
illocutionary point for a declarative, so storytelling cannot carry a weak commitment to 
baptizing.  The Meinongian cannot establish a baptism for fictional characters and thus 
cannot reconcile the causal theory of reference with his or her ontology of fictional 
characters. 
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